Xi’s appointees to China’s top military decision-making and command body boast combat experience and Taiwan expertise. While this doesn’t necessarily portend a confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, it does point to a more military-focused approach to the Taiwan issue.

While the world’s attention was focused on the appointment of Xi Jinping for an unprecedented third term at last month’s 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi quietly appointed a new line-up of military leaders. These six members – who will sit on the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military body – will shape China’s military and security policy for the next five years, if not longer.

Their appointment also signals that Xi is more serious about Taiwan.

Personal relationships have long proved beneficial to upward mobility in Chinese politics, so it comes as no surprise that ties to Xi influenced the new CMC leadership. But two other interrelated traits seemed equally important, and potentially worrisome for the international community: operational experience in China’s Eastern Theatre Command (ETC), which oversees Taiwan military planning, and combat experience.

In other words, Taiwan – and the operational imperatives for a military contingency – appear to have been prominently on Xi’s mind in choosing his next slate of military leaders. While this might not necessarily translate to increased tension and confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, it does underscore a military-focused approach to the Taiwan problem.

The CMC is China’s highest military operational and decision-making body. Distinct from the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China – whose primary purpose is to interface with foreign militaries and publish news about the Chinese military – the CMC has operational oversight of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s armed forces, and oversees its strategy, doctrine, personnel, equipment, and funding and assets, among other duties.

The body is led by Xi, its chairman, two vice-chairman and four other members who together form the nucleus of China’s military operations.

In past party congresses, the choice of civilians to serve as vice-chairman meant that an heir apparent for General Secretary had been chosen. 

Xi himself and former Chinese presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin all served as vice-chairmen before taking over as General Secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the CMC. 

This year, as expected, Xi did not choose any civilians for the role, suggesting his control and consolidation of power within the PLA and CMC is undiminished.

Personal ties have proved the determining factor for Xi’s new CMC roster. Its highest ranking vice-chairman, General Zhang Youxia, is one of Xi’s most trusted officers in the PLA: his father Zhang Zongxun, a founding member of the PLA, served alongside Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun during the founding of the People’s Republic.

Zhang, who served as the second vice-chair on the last CMC, was so desirable a choice that Xi brought him on to serve another term despite Zhang being 72, breaking the normal protocol for retirement at 68.

Below Zhang is General He Weidong, a fellow vice-chairman, and new CMC member Admiral Miao Hua, both of whom were working in Fujian province in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Xi was the province’s deputy party secretary and governor. Xi and He also reportedly overlapped when Xi was party secretary of Zhejiang province.

Beyond these close connections, the new line-up of leaders stands out for several reasons.

It was not that big of a surprise that Xi chose to retain Zhang Youxia, a close and experienced ally. The appointment of the other vice-chairman, He Weidong, was.

He recently served as commander of the ETC, with responsibility over Taiwan and the East China Sea. He also served briefly on the CMC’s joint operations command centre – the top joint command and control centre of the PLA. In this sense, He is arguably one of the most knowledgeable military planners on Taiwan in the PLA.

However, He had not previously served on the Central Committee of the Communist Party nor on the CMC – two preparatory posts for future vice-chairman spots. 

Xi essentially had He jump two grades to land the second CMC vice-chairmanship – a strong sign of endorsement, and an unmistakable signal that operational experience near Taiwan matters for military leadership.

When viewed in the context of the other CMC appointments, He’s rise raises alarm bells about the implications for military tension between the People’s Republic and Taiwan.

With his new roster, Xi has signalled that in addition to personal ties, combat and operational experience also matter. Zhang and new CMC committee member, Liu Zhenli, are two of only a handful of generals in China who have served during the Sino-Vietnam war of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Meanwhile, new appointee Miao Hua has an extensive background in military districts in Xiamen opposite Taiwan.

Taken together, these appointments may offer the clearest signs yet that Xi aims to focus the PLA even more on a possible Taiwan contingency. While not a prediction of confrontation, it does demonstrate that a background in combat and in the planning of a Taiwan scenario may be variables that matter in Xi’s choice of military leaders.sc

*Lyle J. Morris is a senior fellow for foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis

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