With Sanctioning Zarif, chance was lost for exploring whether the JCPOA could lead to serious negotiations on other matters of concern to outsiders.

In the latest tit-for-tat in the battle between the United States and Iran, this week the Treasury Department, at the behest of the State Department, imposed sanctions on the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. 
Sanctioning Khamenei is of no consequence, since he obviously is not planning a trip to the United States or any other form of intercourse with it. Not so with Zarif. In the first place, it is most unusual to place the chief negotiator for an unfriendly (or even enemy) nation on the “unwelcome” list. It is a direct violation of accepted diplomatic practice, going all the way back to the Greeks a few thousand years ago, as well as of Article 31 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which governs the way in which countries agree to treat foreign diplomats  
So why do it? If Trump does want to open negotiations with Iran, as he repeatedly says, this act weakens even further those within the Iranian political struggle who would like to see some way out of the current crisis with the West, as opposed to hardliners who seem indifferent to the risks that they are running.
Zarif has done his share of tongue lashing of the United States, especially of Trump and his uber-hawkish national security advisor, John Bolton. Thus, some pushback is nothing special. By contrast, one view in the Trump administration is that Zarif is really of no account in the actual Iranian power structure so no damage is done if he is sanctioned. But then what’s the point of doing anything to him?
Trump, Bolton, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, another hawk on Iran, clearly see every step they take against the Islamic Republic as part of the campaign of “maximum pressure.” While Bolton has made no secret of wanting war and Pompeo may agree, supposedly Trump doesn’t want to go that far. That is wise, given the almost certain damage that a war or even just a collapse of Iran as a single country would do throughout the Middle East, including to all of Washington’s regional partners and allies.
Further, Trump and Company almost surely decided that “something more had to be done,” following several recent incidents regarding shipping. 
Britain seized an Iranian oil tanker, the Grace 1, off Gibraltar, reportedly at U.S. request, as the ship was supposedly violating EU sanctions against supplying oil to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. 
After Iran responded some British vessels in the region of the Strait of Hormuz and then seizing a British tanker, the Stena Impero, Britain dispatched a couple of naval vessels to the Persian Gulf. 
Further, the new UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, is determined to appear decisive on all fronts. 
Washington’s efforts to cobble together a group of NATO nations to provide some such protection, however, have not achieved much to date. 
Indeed, other European states are deeply worried that the current crisis will just get worse, and these worries are shared by everyone involved in the global oil trade. 
Even without physical blockage of shipping, attacks on oil tankers would overnight send insurance rates steeply upwards. 
Lost in all the talk about Iran possibly trying to close the Strait of Hormuz is the fact that Tehran is as dependent as anyone else in the world on the free flow of hydrocarbons. Indeed, given crippling US economic sanctions, it may have the most to lose from any disruption in oil traffic.
The Trump administration likely has some other motives for the “dust in their eyes” sanctioning of the Iranian foreign minister. For one thing, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium, though modestly; this was, in fact, a long time coming, given that it has been more than a year since Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 
That agreement was the most significant U.S. geostrategic achievement in the Middle East since the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. 
Another reason may well be the fact that Zarif, who studied for years in the U.S. — he holds a PhD from the University of Denver — and whose American English is impeccable, has been a particularly effective spokesperson for Tehran. He’s been notably successful with members of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, which he has long cultivated not only as foreign minister, but also as his country’s ambassador to the United Nations from 2002 to 2007.
Bolton/Pompeo might just want to show toughness at a moment when they’ve lost the internal fight in the administration over whether to renew sanctions waivers for those countries that are cooperating with Iran’s civilian nuclear program, consistent with their JCPOA obligations.
What the U.S. has done regarding Zarif is also consistent with Trump’s standard tactic of trying to change the subject when he gets into trouble. 
The U.S. Congress has just passed legislation halting the supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia for its conflict in Yemen—characterized by the United Nations as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis—in which the United States (along with Britain) has been deeply engaged through a wide range of support activities. 
This vote, including a majority in the Republican-controlled Senate, was embarrassing to Mr. Trump, notwithstanding his veto (which has just been sustained).
While it can still be possible for some diplomatic approaches to bear fruit, and there has been a lot of talk by Trump, sanctioning Zarif doesn’t help. It sends a bad message. 
It also further alienates the United States on this issue from its European allies (save perhaps Boris Johnson’s Britain with his compelling need, with Brexit looming, to cozy up to the United States). They are deeply opposed to war with Iran and are firm supporters of the JCPOA.
At heart, the U.S.-Iranian crisis is artificial, at least in terms of core U.S. interests. 
The JCPOA effectively took care of most of America’s strategic business in the region. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. didn’t fully keep its part of the bargain under President Barack Obama, regarding the full lifting of sanctions (while nuclear-related sanctions came off, others were maintained and even increased). 
Thus the chance was lost for exploring whether the JCPOA could lead to serious negotiations on other matters of concern to outsiders. 
Maybe the Iranian clerics would not have been interested in any such further negotiations, but we will never know.
What we do know is that this week, through one small symbolic action, the Trump administration removed from play the one Iranian with a proven track record of working effectively with outsiders, including the United States. This makes matters worse.
Further, not immaterial, Whatever else is involved, the Trump administration’s actions this week are unworthy of a nation and further damages its reputation. And that is a high cost, indeed!

*Robert E. Hunter is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy

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*This article reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the opinions of the "isal news" agency.